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ABSTRACT: Individuals playing a sequence of different games have shown to learn about the other player’s behavior
during their initial interaction and apply this knowledge when playing another game with the same individual in the
future. Here we use a published computational cognitive model to generate predictions for an upcoming human study.
The model plays both Prisoner’s Dilemma and Chicken Game with a confederate agent who uses one of two
predetermined strategies and whose level of trustworthiness is manipulated. We go beyond the standard postdictive
practice and adopt the increasingly popular practice of using the model to make a priori predictions before the human
data will be collected in an upcoming study.

1.

Introduction and Background

How people learn to trust one another over time and how
they use this information to inform their future decisions is
a question relevant to many aspects of human interaction.
Trust is defined as “the willingness of a party to be
vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the
expectations that they will perform a particular action”
(Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Trust relationships
have been proposed to be self-sustaining once developed,
allowing individuals to forgo re-evaluation of a person
after they have been determined to be trustworthy (Hardin,
2002). Yamagishi, Kanazawa, Mashima, and Terai (2005)
found that when participants played a modified version of
the game Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), where participants
could choose the amount of points they could risk during
each round, over time participants would gradually
increase the number of points they would risk as the
individuals began to establish trust for one another.
Consistent with these results, Castelfranchi & Falcone
(2010) suggest that trust mitigates risk and develops
through gradual risk-taking between two individuals.
In order to study how individuals behave in different
situations, both economic and psychological research have

used games of strategic interaction. A game represents an
abstraction of a real-world scenario in which participants
can win and lose points based on the behavior of both
players. Participants can play either with another human
participant (e.g., Juvina, Saleem, Martin, Gonzalez, &
Lebiere, 2013) or with a preprogrammed strategy (e.g.,
Juvina, Lebiere, Martin, & Gonzalez, 2012).
Two different strategies that have been used in place of
human participants during these games of strategic
interaction are the Tit-for-Tat (T4T) (Axelrod, 1984) and
the Pavlov-Tit-for-Tat strategy (PT4T) introduced by
Juvina, Lebiere, Gonzalez and Saleem (2012). T4T is a
simple strategy, which repeats on round N the same choice
that the other player made on round N-1. The PT4T
strategy is a combination of two different strategies, T4T
and Pavlov. Pavlov is another simple strategy that
continues to choose the same choice on round N as long as
it earned points with that choice on round N-1, only
changing choices on round N when it lost points on round
N-1. The PT4T strategy repeats the other player’s move
from N-1 on round N, just as the T4T strategy, except for
when the strategy and the other player make opposite
choices and the strategy earns points on that round. Instead
of switching to the other player’s choice as the

T4T strategy would, the PT4T strategy repeats its previous
choice, as the Pavlov strategy would. The PT4T strategy
was created based on analysis of the repetition propensities
(the probability to repeat a move following a certain
outcome) of humans in PD and in an attempt to develop a
strategy that had similar repetition propensities as humans
(Juvina et al., 2012).
Previous research has found that when individuals play
games of strategic interaction sequentially, they use the
information gained about the other player from a previous
game to inform their choices when playing with that person
again (Juvina et al., 2013). Different explanations have
been offered for why these transfer effects occur, such as a
similarity between the games, the expectation of the other
player to behave as they did in the past, or a strategy that
was used during a simpler game continuing to be used in a
more complex game (Knez & Cramer, 2000; Devetag,
2003; Bednar, 2012 ).
Juvina et al. (2013) found that these explanations failed to
account for the transfer effects seen when repeated rounds
of the games Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and Chicken Game
(CG) were played sequentially. As an alternative
explanation for why transfer effects occur between these
games, Juvina et al. (2013) proposed that it is the increase
in reciprocal trust between the two players that results in a
transfer of learning occurring between these games,
allowing them to find the optimal outcome faster in the
second game compared to the first. Juvina, Lebiere, and
Gonzalez (2014) implemented this idea of reciprocal trust
in a computational cognitive model that replicates the
transfer effects seen when the games PD and CG are played
sequentially in either order.
The results in Juvina et al. (2014) were obtained by fitting
the model post-hoc to the human data from Juvina et al.
(2013) by manipulating certain model parameters.
However, fitting the model post-hoc to a specific dataset
does not ensure its validity and generalizability. In order to
fit the human data, the model played against itself, using
both the same parameters and learning mechanisms to
determine how to play both games. This is problematic
when trying to understand real world scenarios where
individuals are likely to have different goals and
understandings of the current situation. Due to these
differences, it has not yet been shown that the model can
account for human behavior when playing against an
individual who has a different approach and a different
level of trustworthiness.
We are attempting to validate the model used in Juvina et
al. (2014) by using the model to simulate the results of an
upcoming study to be conducted with human participants.
The model will play two games sequentially, either PD and
CG in varying orders or one of the two games twice with a

preprogrammed confederate agent. The confederate agent
will use one of two predetermined strategies and will have
varying levels of trustworthiness. A comparison of the
model’s predictions to the behavior of human participants
will allow for an opportunity to examine in what types of
situations the model can predict the behavior of human
participants. In this article, a brief overview of the model
and the experimental design of the simulation is offered,
along with a discussion of the model’s predictions for the
upcoming study to be conducted with human participants.
1.1 The Games
Participants will play repeated rounds of the same two
games used in Juvina et al.’s (2013) original study, which
are PD and CG. Both PD and CG are mixed motive nonzero sum games and are represented by their own payoff
matrix (Fig 1.1). During each round in a game, both Player
1(P1) and Player 2 (P2) choose to either defect (A) or
cooperate (B). Based on the choices made by both players
during every round, P1 or P2 either win or lose a certain
number of points.

Fig 1.1. The payoff matrix for the game Prisoners dilemma
(left) and Chicken Game (right).
When either PD or CG is played continually and both
players do not know how long they will play, each game
has a different optimal outcome. In PD, the optimal
outcome over the course of the game is for both players to
choose B (mutual cooperation) in order to earn one point
each during each round (Fig 1.1). In CG, the optimal
outcome is for both players to asymmetrically alternate
between choosing A and B, earning three points every
other round (Fig 1.1). However, when playing either CG or
PD, attempting to choose the optimal outcome is risky. If
only one player understands the benefits of sustaining the
mutual cooperation or alternation outcome and is willing to
reciprocate, then the player who attempts the optimal
strategy will lose points as the other player gains points. To
avoid this, players must learn to mutually cooperate with
one another by sustaining the optimal outcome throughout
the game, which maximizes their payoffs when either PD
or CG is played repeatedly (Juvina et al., 2013). Due to the
fact that each game has a different optimal outcome, the
behavior of both players should change along with the
games that are played.

Although PD and CG have different payoff matrices,
certain characteristics are similar across both games. There
are both surface and deep similarities. The surface
similarity between PD and CG that is relevant in this
context is that both players during either game can choose
B to earn one point during each round. Both games also
share a deep similarity that is both players mutually
cooperating with each another brings about the optimal
outcome when either game is played repeatedly. Players
can mutually cooperate by both choosing B in PD and
asymmetrically alternating between A and B in CG (Juvina
et al., 2013). Juvina et al. (2013) has found that when PD
and CG are played sequentially the transfer effects between
these games occur along both the surface and deep
similarities. In particular, more mutual cooperation was
seen in PD when played after CG and more alternation was
seen in CG when played after PD.

To account for the behavior of the human participants in
each game, the model uses both IBL and reinforcement
learning. During each round, the model attempts to recall a
previous instance from memory using both its own and the
other player’s previous move as retrieval cues. The stored
previous instances in the model’s declarative memory
allow it to recall what the other player’s next move was
when placed in that situation before. The model predicts
that the other player will choose the move that was chosen
more frequently when placed in similar situations in the
past. The model then chooses to cooperate or defect
depending on which choice has the greatest utility given
the model’s prediction of the other player’s move. Previous
rewards the model has received for cooperating and
defecting in similar contexts (i.e., the other players
expected next move based on the previous move of the
other player and the model) determine the utility or the
value of these choices to the model (Juvina et al., 2014).

1.2 The Model
A brief overview of the model used to generate the
predictions of the upcoming study is given here; a more
detailed description of the model can be found in Juvina et
al. (2014). The model was built in ACT-R (Adaptive
Control of Thought - Rational), which is both a cognitive
architecture and a theory of human cognition (Anderson,
2007). In ACT-R, different modules interact with each
other in order to complete a task. In the model used for this
study, two memory modules are used in order to play both
games; these are the declarative and procedural modules.
The declarative module stores information that the model
has learned from the environment. The procedural memory
allows for action selection reinforced through reward
patterns that occur within the environment (Anderson,
2007). Both modules are used together to account for
human behavior in the two games when played
independently and sequentially.
In order for the model to be able to play either game, it
needs to be aware of the interdependence between itself
and the other player; to do this the model uses instancebased learning (IBL: Gonzalez, Lerch, & Lebiere, 2003).
In IBL, past instances of an event are stored in a model’s
declarative memory to be recalled later, and inform future
decisions. When the model is in a situation similar to a
previous experience, it uses information stored in its
declarative memory to make a decision about what to do in
its current situation. At each round, the model stores in its
declarative memory the previous move of both itself and
the other player along with the other player’s move for the
current round. Throughout both games, each time the
model stores a copy of a previous instance that has already
been placed in its declarative memory it increases the
probability that that specific instance will be recalled when
placed in a similar situation again, as controlled by ACTR’s activation equations (Anderson, 2007).

In order to account for the deep transfer effects seen when
PD and CG are played sequentially, two trust accumulators
and three different reward functions were added to the
model. The two accumulators are called trust and trustinvest. Each accumulator starts at zero at the beginning of
the first game and increases or decreases depending on the
moves both the model and the other player make after each
round. The trust accumulator increases when both players
either mutually cooperate or when the model defects and
the other player cooperates. It decreases when both players
mutually defect or when the model cooperates and when
the other player defects. The trust-invest accumulator
increases with mutual defections and decreases with
unreciprocated cooperation. Throughout either game the
current levels of the trust and trust-invest accumulators
determine the model’s current reward function.
Three reward functions are used which reinforce the
model’s choices differently for each of the four possible
outcomes that can occur during a game, in turn affecting
the model’s behavior. By alternating between three
different reward functions, the model uses the reward
function that is most applicable to its current situation. The
reward function that is applied to the current round of the
game is determined by the level of the trust and trust-invest
accumulator. When the trust accumulator is positive, the
model is reinforced for increasing the payoff of both
players. When only the trust-invest accumulator is positive,
the model is reinforced for increasing the payoff of the
other player. When both accumulators are at or below zero,
the model is reinforced for maximizing its own payoff and
minimizing the payoff of the other player.

2. The Experiment
The model predictions presented in this paper were
generated by simulating a fully balanced 4 x 2 x 2

experiment that will be conducted with human participants.
Participants will play both PD and CG or one of these two
games twice. Instead of participants playing games with
one another as in Juvina et al.’s (2013), participants will
play with a “confederate agent”, implemented as a software
agent. The confederate agent will use one of two
predetermined strategies and the trustworthiness of the
agent will be controlled, while playing both games. The
model was run in conditions identical to those that future
participants will be placed in.
On Qualtrics.com, the online platform that will be used to
run the upcoming experiment, we created sixteen
conditions with each possible combination of game order,
confederate agent’s strategy, and trustworthiness. In each
condition, ten preprogrammed versions of each game were
developed to ensure random variability in the behavior of
the confederate agent. Once the experiment begins
participants will first be randomly assigned to a condition
and then randomly assigned to play one of the ten possible
versions of each of the two games they will play during the
experiment. The experimental protocol for the upcoming
study was copied when generating model predictions,
simulating fifty human participants in each condition.
2.1 The Confederate Agent
The confederate agent will utilize one of two
predetermined strategies throughout both games. The T4T
strategy will choose on round N the choice that the other
player made on round N-1. The PT4T strategy will
reciprocate mutual cooperation and defection, but will not
reciprocate unilateral cooperation.
Along with using one of two predetermined strategies, the
confederate agent’s trustworthiness will be manipulated
and randomness will be added into its behavior. To
accomplish this, the confederate agent will either cooperate
or defect a certain number of times throughout each game
at random times. In the high trustworthiness (HT)
condition the confederate agent will cooperate and in the
low trustworthiness (LT) conditions the confederate agent
will defect. For this experiment, we wanted to create a
confederate agent that would generate significant
differences in the outcomes that were chosen across all
conditions. To accomplish this, multiple model predictions
for all conditions were run by varying the number of rounds
the confederate agent employed its strategy (reactive
strategy – T4T or PT4T) and automatic cooperation or
defection (fixed strategy). We found that, because PT4T is
inherently less trustworthy than T4T (i.e., more apt to
defect), to avoid the model only predicting a high
frequency of mutual defection during the PT4T HT
conditions, a larger percentage of cooperation was needed
to raise the strategies trustworthiness. For this experiment,
during the T4T conditions, the confederate agent will

employ the T4T strategy randomly during 90% of the
game, while randomly employing its fixed strategy during
10% of the game. During the PT4T conditions, the
confederate agent will employ the PT4T strategy randomly
during 65% of the game and randomly employ its fixed
strategy during 35% of the game.

3. Results and Discussion of the Model’s
Predictions
We computed the frequency of five relevant outcomes
during each round in every condition over the fifty
different model runs. In order to determine instances of
asymmetrical alternation, rounds where one player chose
to defect while the other player cooperated or vice versa on
round N and had both chosen the opposite choices on round
N-1 were identified. The frequency of alternation during
each round across all conditions was computed like all
other outcomes. Because of the limitation of space in this
paper, we cannot report all of the results. All of the model’s
predictions are available for viewing and can be
downloaded at
(http://psych-scholar.wright.edu/ijuvina/publications). A
linear mixed effects analysis (LME) was used to assess the
effect of strategy, trustworthiness of the confederate agent,
and order in which the games were played on the predicted
frequency of the five outcomes. P-values were obtained
using a likelihood ratio test comparing a full to a reduced
model. The 95% confidence intervals for the effects
predicted by the LME are also reported. It should be noted
that the confidence intervals that are reported are large,
which is expected given the large variability generated by
each ACT-R model, the randomness added to the
confederate agent, and the multitude of experimental
conditions. The model’s predictions will be compared to
human data from each condition, once the experiment has
been run.
Transfer effects were assessed using a paired t-test, run on
the frequency of each outcome during the first game
compared to the frequency of that outcome when the same
game was played second against a confederate agent of the
same strategy and level of trustworthiness. Significant
results indicate that the order in which the model played
the game affected the frequency that an outcome was
chosen during that game.
3.1 Effects of Trustworthiness
One clear difference seen across the high and low
trustworthiness conditions in the model’s predictions is the
level of the trust accumulator. A t-test run on the round-byround average of the magnitude of the trust accumulator
across the simulated low (M = -66.86, SD = 38.11) and high
(M = 62.36, SD = 39.17) trustworthiness conditions was

found to be significant (t(49) = 66.87, p < .001). The
model’s current level of the trust accumulator affects which
current reward function is used and will determine whether
the model will attempt to maximize its own payoff or the
payoff of both players. The difference in the trust
accumulator between the simulation of the high and low
trustworthiness conditions indicates that the experimental
manipulations of trustworthiness were effective. Based on
its level of trust, the model predicts a difference in the
frequency that mutual defection will occur in both games,
despite differences in the strategy used by the confederate
agent and order.

outcomes that can be achieved during a game. For
example, continual alternation is an outcome that can only
be achieved with the T4T strategy and not with the PT4T
strategy. Continual mutual cooperation is also an outcome
that is harder to achieve with the PT4T strategy, because it
is inherently less trustworthy (i.e., more apt to defect). It is
the differences in the behavior of these two strategies used
by the confederate agent that affected the predicted
frequency in which the optimal outcomes will be chosen
despite differences in the trustworthiness of the
confederate agent or the order in which the games are
played.

A LME was run with the average predicted frequency of
mutual defection as a dependent variable, trustworthiness
of the confederate agent as a fixed effect, with strategy,
order, and round as random factors. A likelihood ratio test
was run and found that the trustworthiness of the
confederate agent was found to have a significant effect on
the predicted frequency of mutual defection (X2(1) = 277.3,
p < .001), increasing the frequency of mutual defection by
75.07% ± .6%, 95% CI [52% , 98 %], during the simulated
low trustworthiness conditions compared to 15.4% ±6.5%,
95% CI [0 , 37.33%], in the simulated high trustworthiness
conditions (Fig. 1.2).

A LME was run with the average predicted frequency of
mutual cooperation as a dependent variable, strategy as a
fixed factor, with trustworthiness, order, and round as
mixed effects. A likelihood ratio test was conducted and
found that the strategy implemented by the confederate
agent significantly affected the predicted frequency of
mutual cooperation (X2(1) = 68.867, p < .001). The T4T
strategy had a larger affect on the predicted frequency of
mutual cooperation, increasing its predicted frequency by
25.1% ± .7%, 95% CI [0 , 70%] compared to when the
confederate agent used the PT4T strategy, increasing the
predicted frequency of mutual cooperation by only 19%
±13.7%, 95% CI [0 , 62%] (Fig 1.3). A second LME was
run with the average predicted frequency of alternation as
a dependent variable, strategy as a fixed factor, with
trustworthiness, order, and round as random factors.
Similar to mutual cooperation, the strategy used by the
confederate agent was found to have a significant effect on
the predicted frequency of alternation (X2(1) = 392.21, p <
.001). Conditions where the confederate agent used the
T4T strategy had a larger affect on the predicted frequency
of alternation, increasing the frequency by 12.9% ± 0.4%,
95% CI [6% , 30%] in conditions where the confederate
agent used the T4T strategy compared to only 4% ± 6%,
95% CI [0% , 20%] when it used the PT4T strategy (Fig
1.3).

Fig 1.2. The average round-by-round frequency that
mutual defection was chosen across all of the simulated
high (dashed red line) and low (solid black line)
trustworthiness conditions.
The trustworthiness of the confederate agent determines
whether it will cooperate (high trustworthiness) or defect
(low trustworthiness) for a specific number of times (10%
of the rounds in the T4T and 35% of the rounds in the
PT4T) over the course of the game at random times. The
model predicts that participants will be sensitive to the
trustworthiness of the confederate agent, responding by
defecting more throughout the low trustworthiness
conditions and less during the high trustworthiness
conditions.
3.2 Effects of Strategy
The two types of strategies used by the confederate agent
have different criteria for deciding what choice to choose
during each round; these differences limit how quickly the
model can change from one outcome to another and the

The strategy used by the confederate agent was also found
to have a significant effect on the predicted frequency of
mutual defection, controlling for trustworthiness and order.
A LME was run with the average predicted frequency of
mutual defection as a dependent variable and strategy as a
fixed factor, with trustworthiness, order, and round as
random effects. A likelihood ratio test was conducted and
found that the strategy used by the confederate agent had a
significant effect on the predicted frequency of mutual
defection (X2(1) = 574.02, p < .001). Conditions where the
confederate agent used the PT4T

Fig 1.3. A comparison of the average predicted frequency per round of three different outcomes: mutual cooperation (CC),
alternation (ALT), and mutual defection (DD), across all the Tit-for-Tat (T4T, solid black line) and Pavlov-Tit-For-Tat
(PT4T, dashed red line) conditions. The 95% confidence intervals per round for each outcome and condition are also
plotted
strategy had a larger effect on the predicted frequency of
mutual defection, increasing its frequency by 54.1% ±
29%, 95% CI [0%, 100%], compared to when the
confederate agent used the T4T strategy increasing the
predicted frequency of mutual defection by only 36.31% ±
.6%, 95% CI [0% , 100%] (Fig 1.3).
The model predicts that participants will react differently
to the two different strategies used by the confederate
agent. Alternation and mutual cooperation are both
predicted to occur at a higher frequency during all of the
T4T conditions compared to the PT4T conditions. A higher
predicted frequency of alternation occuring during the T4T
conditions would be expected, because the PT4T strategy
cannot continually alternate throughout the game like the
T4T strategy. However, the T4T and PT4T strategy can
both mutually cooperate throughout a game. The difference
that the frequency of mutual cooperation is predicted to
occur is caused by the strategies’ behavior during the
experiment when played with repeatedly, because repeated
instances of mutual cooperation are harder to obtain with
the PT4T strategy than with the T4T strategy. In addition,
as is seen in the model’s predictions, the PT4T condition is
predicted to have a higher frequency of mutual defection
across all conditions, which would affect the model’s trust
in the confederate agent, leading it to cooperate less in
conditions where the confederate agent used the PT4T
strategy compared to the T4T strategy.
3.3 Effects of Order
The optimal outcomes that are chosen during the
experiment depend on the games that are played during
each condition. For example, alternation is the optimal

outcome in CG, but is not an optimal outcome in PD,
because alternating between a payoff of +4 and -4 points
per round leads to a net gain of 0 for both players. While
playing PD, mutual cooperation is the optimal strategy and
though mutual cooperation is a possible outcome in CG, it
leads to a sub-optimal outcome compared to alternation, +1
point per round compared to +3 points every other round.
Juvina et al. (2013) found that order also affects the
frequency of the optimal outcomes during a game. The
optimal outcome in either PD or CG occured more
frequently when it was played after the other game
compared to when played first. Due to the effects that order
has been seen to have on the outcomes that are chosen over
the course of both games, the model will predict a
significant difference in the frequency of the two optimal
outcomes over the course of the two games depending on
the order that they are played.
A LME was run with the average predicted frequency of
mutual cooperation as a dependent variable, order as a
fixed effect, with trustworthiness and strategy of the
confederate agent and round as random effects. A
likelihood ratio test was conducted and found that the order
in which the games were played in a condition significantly
affected the frequency of mutual cooperation (X2(3) =
712.98, p < .001), increasing the predicted frequency of
mutual cooperation by 36.6% ±1%, 95% CI [0% , 79%] in
the simulated conditions when PD was played repeatedly
(PDPD order), 28.47% ± 1%, 95% CI [0% , 71%], when
PD was played before CG (PDCG order), 13.10% ± 1% ,
95% CI [0% , 71%], when CG was played before PD
(CGPD order), and 10% ±12.3%, 95% CI [0% , 51%],
when CG was played twice (CGCG order).

Fig 1.4. Comparison of the model predictions of the average predicted frequency per round of two different optimal
outcomes: mutual cooperation (CC, solid black line) and alternation (ALT, dashed red line), across all of the different
orders that PD and CG were played in. The 95% confidence intervals per round for each outcome and condition are also
plotted.
To test the significance of the effect of order on the
predicted frequency of alternation, a LME was run with the
average predicted frequency of alternation as a dependent
variable, order as a fixed factor, with trustworthiness and
strategy of the confederate agent and round as random
effects. The order in which the games were played was
found to significantly affect the predicted frequency of
alternation, opposite that of the predicted frequency of
mutual cooperation (X2(3) = 712.98, p < .001). Game order
affected the frequency of alternation by 15.5% ±5.9%, 95%
CI [0% , 33%], in simulated conditions with the CGCG
order, 11.9% ± .5%, 95% CI [0% , 23%], in the CGPD
order, 4.95% ± .05%, 95% CI [0 % , 23%], in the PDCG
order, and 1.86% ±.05%, 95% CI [0% , 20%], in the PDPD
order (Fig 1.4).
The affect that the order games were played had on the
predicted frequency of the optimal outcomes show that in
conditions where the same game is played repeatedly, such
as in the PDPD and CGCG order, the model predicts that
the frequency of the optimal outcome for that game will
continue to increase throughout the condition. The model
also makes an uncharacteristic prediction about the
frequency that mutual cooperation and alternation in the
conditions simulated with the PDCG and CGPD order. It
would be expected based on results from Juvina et al.
(2013), that conditions with the PDCG order would have a
higher frequency of alternation than the CGPD order, and
that the CGPD order would have a higher frequency of
mutual cooperation than with the PDCG order. Instead, the
model predicts that when PD and CG are played in
sequence, the highest frequency of mutual cooperation will
be in conditions with the PDCG order and the highest
frequency of alternation will occur in conditions with the
CGPD order.
3.4 Predicted Transfer Effects

Previous results with human pairs have found that when
PD and CG were played in sequence, transfer effects
between these two games occur along both their surface
and deep similarities (Juvina et al., 2013). The same
transfer effects have also been found when cognitive
models were paired with one another (Juvina et al., 2014)
In contrast, when a cognitive model was paired with a preprogrammed agent as in the current study, no deep transfer
effects are predicted; the model only predicts surface
transfer effects. Mutual cooperation in the T4T HT
condition is predicted to occur at a higher frequency during
CG when played after PD compared to when played before
PD (t(49) = -21.8871, p < .001). The same prediction about
the frequency of mutual cooperation is made during the
PT4T HT condition. Mutual cooperation is predicted to
occur at a higher frequency during CG when played after
PD compared to when played before PD (t(49) = -38.429,
p < .001).
The surface transfer effect of mutual cooperation in the
PDCG order during the PT4T HT condition is amplified by
the limitations of the confederate agent’s strategy. Because
continual alternation cannot be achieved with the PT4T
strategy, mutual cooperation, a sub-optimal outcome in
CG, is left as the only satisfactory outcome that can be
achieved given the behavior of the confederate agent. One
possible explanation for the lack of deep transfer effects in
the model’s predictions is the difference between the
behavior of the confederate agent and an actual human
player. The confederate agent is simpler than the model
(even with the added randomness) and does not learn from
the interaction with the model throughout the game. If
confirmed, the prediction of a lack of deep transfer will
strengthen the claim made in Juvina et al. (2013, 2014) that
joint learning and reciprocal trust are key ingredients for a
deep transfer of learning in games of strategic interaction.

4. Conclusion

In summary, we are validating a computational cognitive
model that has shown to be able to account for the transfer
effects that are observed when the games PD and CG are
played repeatedly and in sequence with human
participants. In order to validate the model, we have made
a priori model predictions about the behavior of human
participants when playing against a preprogrammed
confederate agent across a variety of conditions. From the
model’s predictions we have developed five hypotheses for
the upcoming study.
H1: We predict that mutual defection will be chosen more
across all of the low trustworthiness conditions compared
to the high trustworthiness conditions.
H2: We predict both optimal outcomes (i.e., mutual
cooperation and alternation) will be chosen at a higher
frequency in condtions where the confederate agent uses
the T4T compared to the PT4T strategy.
H3: We predict that the frequency of both optimal
outcomes (i.e., mutual cooperation and alternation) will
depend on the order that games are played in a conditon.
H4: We predict that across the sixteen conditions no deep
transfer of learning will occur.
H5: We predict that across the sixteen conditions surface
transfers of learning will only occur with the mutual
coopertion outcome in the PDCG PT4T HT and PDCG
T4T HT condition.
We expect to run the study in 2015. A subsequenct
publication will reveal the actual empirical results and
degree of model predictive validity.
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